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Abstract 
Very few existing studies have estimated female labor supply elasticities using a U.S. panel 
data set, though cross-sectional studies abound.  Also, most existing studies have done so in 
a static framework.  I make an attempt to fill the gap in this literature, by estimating a 
lifecycle-consistent specification with taxes, in a limited dependent variable framework, on a 
panel of married females from the PSID.  Both parametric random effects and 
semiparametric fixed effects methods are applied.  I find evidence of larger substitution 
effects than found in female labor supply literature with taxes, suggesting considerable 
distortionary effects from income taxation.  The uncompensated wage elasticity is estimated 
at 1.4, which is comparable to estimates found in other labor supply studies with taxes.  The 
income effect in a lifecycle-consistent specification is negative and very small.  The estimate 
of compensated elasticity for females in the sample is 1.4 using random effects estimator 
and 1.35 using semiparametric fixed effect estimator.  I estimate exact deadweight loss from 
taxes and find that deadweight loss from a 20% increase in the marginal tax rate is about 
30% of tax revenue collected, evaluated at the sample mean.  The deadweight loss from 
taxation of wife’s labor income from 1980-1987, for a median household is estimated to be 
57% of tax revenue as opposed to 49% for a switch to a revenue-neutral proportional tax 
system.  Finally, the intertemporal preference parameters are estimated using GMM.   
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1.   Introduction 
 
Due to a sustained increase in female labor force participation and proliferation of 
tax and transfer policies targeted at their labor market behavior, the estimation of female 
labor supply elasticities is an important focus of research in public finance and labor 
economics.  There is a very large literature on female labor supply, but little consensus on 
elasticity estimates.  For example, the estimates of compensated wage elasticities range from 
-0.12 (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1981) to as large as 15.35 (Dooley, 1982).   However, 
there is little disagreement that female elasticities are much larger than those for males, 
implying bigger deadweight loss from taxation (Hausman, 1981a; Triest, 1990; Kimmel and 
Kniesner, 1998).  In this paper, I estimate female labor supply elasticities in the presence of 
taxes in a lifecycle-consistent framework, using a panel of married females from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and then calculate the economic cost of taxation.   
The paper makes five contributions to the literature.  First, I empirically estimate a 
lifecycle-consistent secondary earner female labor supply model without imposing 
separability in the intertemporal budget constraint.  I fully take into account the 
nonlinearities in the budget set induced by the tax system by using the differentiable budget 
constraint methodology proposed by MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990).1  Second, I am 
one of the first to apply semiparametric techniques to account for fixed effects in the context 
of female labor supply on a U.S. panel dataset.  Third, this is one of the first attempts to 
estimate a panel selection-bias-corrected wage equation in a Type III Tobit framework.  
                                                 
1 I do not use maximum likelihood with a kinked budget set implemented in the path-breaking works of 
Hausman (1981a) and Burtless and Hausman (1978). This method has been the subject of much controversy 
and debate over the last decades. Besides imposing theoretical restrictions at the kink points (MaCurdy et. al, 
1990), this method is susceptible to nonlinear measurement error problems, and also to errors in specifying the 
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Fourth, I use the labor supply parameter estimates to estimate exact deadweight loss and 
simulate the impact of alternative tax regimes on female labor supply.  Finally, I estimate the 
parameters of the intertemporal Euler equation and intertemporal labor supply elasticity.   
I have five primary findings.  First, the labor supply estimates are sensitive to the 
method used to predict wages for non-workers.  Second, I estimate a compensated wage 
elasticity of 1.4, which translates into a sizeable substitution effect.  Third, my estimates of 
the uncompensated wage elasticity at the intensive margin are between 0.8 and 0.9; on the 
participation margin, the estimated elasticity is 0.7, somewhat lower.  Thus, I find evidence 
of substantial response on both margins.  The large estimated substitution effect has 
implications for tax policy, and creates potential for large efficiency costs of income 
taxation.  Fourth, the exact deadweight loss (at the sample mean) from a 20% tax imposition 
in most specifications is close to 30% of the tax revenue raised.  My simulations indicate 
that the tax system that existed between 1980 and 1987 could have resulted in a deadweight 
loss of 57% of tax revenue collected, for the median married household.  On the other hand, 
a revenue-neutral switch to proportional taxation would reduce deadweight loss from 
taxation to 49% of tax revenue.  Finally, my estimate of the Frisch elasticity of 1.5 is very 
close to the compensated elasticity, which suggests that intratemporal elasticities provide a 
good approximation for evaluation of the intertemporal impact of an anticipated wage 
change.   
The analysis proceeds in three steps.  First, I estimate a selectivity-bias-corrected 
wage equation to predict wages for non-workers in the sample.  I use both a standard probit 
                                                                                                                                                      
budget set. Moreover, Saez (2000) argues that there is lack of clustering of individuals, except at the first kink 
point of the tax system, a situation that is not particularly conducive to maximum likelihood estimation. 
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and a Type III Tobit model that uses more information by specifying a censored selection 
variable based on hours.2   Next, I estimate a lifecycle-consistent labor supply equation 
based on two-stage budgeting, treating the after-tax wage and virtual income as endogenous.  
I use the parametric random effects estimator and semiparametric estimators proposed by 
Honore (1992) and Kyriazidou (1997).  Finally, I use the intratemporal labor supply 
parameter estimates to recover the intertemporal preference parameters.  Specifically, I 
follow Blundell, Meghir, and Neves (1993) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) and 
parameterize a monotonic transformation of the indirect utility function, allowing the 
underlying preference parameters to vary with demographics.  All the variables in the model 
are treated as endogenous, and the parameters of a log transformation of the Euler equation 
are estimated using lagged values of economic and demographic variables in the information 
set as instruments.  I apply iterative GMM to estimate the intertemporal preference 
parameters efficiently.  This step enables me to recover the Frisch elasticity.   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical framework for 
married female labor supply in the presence of joint non-linear capital and labor income 
taxation, and outlines the reasons for the use of two-stage budgeting.  Section 3 outlines the 
econometric specification.  Section 4 provides a brief description of the data and 
construction of these key variables: wage, income, assets and taxes.  Section 5 describes the 
estimation of the selection-bias-corrected wage equation.  The estimation of the labor supply 
equation is discussed in Section 6.  The results on deadweight loss are presented in Section 
                                                 
2 The usual selection equation uses a binary selection indicator as the dependent variable, which leads to a 
Type II Tobit Model. A Type III Tobit model uses more available information by specifying a censored 
selection variable.  For an excellent taxonomy of Tobit models, see Amemiya (1985). 
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7.  The estimation of the intertemporal preference parameters is discussed in Section 8.  
There is a brief conclusion.  
2.   Background and Theoretical Framework 
Most female labor supply studies accounting for taxes have adopted a static 
framework.  Even though I use a dynamic framework to study the effect of taxes, the static 
model serves as a useful starting point to describe the theory.  
2.1  The Static Model with Taxes 
Let ),,( ttt XHCU be a strictly quasiconcave utility function in which tC  is 
consumption in period t , tH  is hours worked, and tX  is a vector of exogenous taste shifters.  
In a standard static labor supply model with taxes, the consumer maximizes the utility 
function in period t , ),,( ttt XHCU , subject to the budget constraint: 
),,( ttttttt EDITyHWC −+= ,    (1) 
where tW  is the gross wage, ty  is the unearned income, tI , the taxable income of the 
individual, tD , the tax deductions, tE , exemptions and ).(T is a function determining tax 
liability.  Graduated tax rate and bracket structures create a piecewise linear budget set with 
kinks at the points where the marginal tax rate changes.  Figure 1 presents the budget set for 
a typical individual under a hypothetical progressive income tax with three tax brackets.  
Earnings up to 1WH  are exempt from taxes.  From 1WH  to 2WH , earnings are taxed at the 
marginal tax rate of 1τ , and from 2WH  to HW , a marginal tax rate of 2τ  applies.  This tax 
system creates three budget set segments with slopes W , )1( 1τ−W , and )1( 2τ−W , 
respectively, and two kinks at 1H  and 2H .  Virtual income is the income associated with 
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zero hours on each budget segment.  In Figure 1, for the first budget segment with no taxes, 
the virtual income is 1y , which is just the unearned income.  However, the second and third 
segments yield virtual incomes vy2  and 
vy3 , respectively.  The intuition behind using 
virtual income is that the consumer's last-dollar marginal tax rate (in the case of progressive 
taxation) is higher than marginal tax rate she faces on other parts of her budget set.  Virtual 
income appropriately adds a lump-sum transfer to the consumer's actual unearned income to 
account for the nonlinear taxation of labor income.  
Utility maximization yields a solution for a labor supply that is a function of the 
individual's after-tax wage, tω , and virtual income, 
v
ty : 
                                   )),(),(( tt
v
tttt XHyHfH ω= .                                                (2) 
Because the tax rate the individual faces is a function of hours, the after-tax wage and virtual 
income are functions of hours worked and in the estimation need to be treated as 
endogenous.    
There are three approaches to the estimation of the static model.  One approach to 
estimating the labor supply function is to linearize the budget constraint at observed hours 
(Hall, 1973).  To account for the fact that taxes are endogenous, one can use an appropriate 
instrumental variable procedure to recover the parameters of the labor supply function.  A 
more efficient approach is to use maximum likelihood to estimate the labor supply function 
while fully accounting for the probability of observing an individual on the budget segments 
or the kinks (Burtless and Hausman, 1978; Hausman, 1980; Hausman, 1981a; Hausman, 
1985a; Hausman, 1985b).  The maximum likelihood approach imposes the requirement of 
exact knowledge of the budget set and all the tax parameters and is particularly vulnerable to 
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measurement error in income.  A third approach is to construct a smooth and differentiable 
budget constraint, as proposed by MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch (1990) and used among 
others by Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), Blomquist (1996), Aaronson and French (2002), that 
provides a reasonable approximation of the tax schedule facing the individual and   
facilitates the use of instrumental variable methods to estimate the labor supply function.   
The static model imposes myopic behavior on the part of consumers and assumes 
perfectly constrained capital markets.  This means that if the labor supply decision is taken 
in a multi-period setting then static regressions can confuse shifts of wage profiles with 
movements along wage profiles, and, thus, yield parameter estimates that lack precise 
economic meaning. The elasticities derived from the static specification can be placed in an 
intertemporal setting but are economically meaningful only under strong assumptions of 
either complete myopia or perfectly constrained capital markets (Blundell and MaCurdy, 
1999). I relax both of these restrictions by estimating a dynamic model with taxes.   
2.2  The Dynamic Model with Taxes 
The consumer maximizes the expected present discounted value of utility: 
    { }
Tt
XHCUE ttt
t
t
tHC tt
,...,2,1,0
),,()1(max
,
=
+∑ −ρ                                      (3)                               
where tr  is the stochastic rate of return and tE  is the expectation operator conditional on the 
information set 1−Ω t , subject to the asset accumulation constraint 
    ),,()1( 1 ttttttttt EDITCHWArA −−++= − ,                         (4) 
where tA  represents assets in period t .  tI  is adjusted gross income, such that  
                                                              1−+= ttttt ArHWI ,                                                   (5) 
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where ),,( ttt EDIT  is a twice continuously differentiable tax function that takes as 
arguments tax deductions, tD , and tax exemptions, tE .
3  
In general in intertemporal models, the current choices of consumption and hours can 
affect future choices in three ways: first, through a wealth effect (i.e., what assets are 
transferred to next period); second, by changing the utility in the next period as it is affected 
by current period consumption (i.e., if preferences are not time separable); or, third, by 
changing next period's relative prices (i.e., if the budget set is not time separable).  Most 
female labor supply studies have assumed a time-separable budget constraint and thereby 
limited linkages of periods through the wealth effect.  However, Blomquist (1985) showed 
that a nonlinear joint capital and labor income tax system has important implications for 
behavior in an intertemporal labor supply model.  In particular, if the tax system is 
sufficiently progressive, individuals may work more in periods in which before-tax wage 
rate is low and vice versa.   
Notice that I can write adjusted gross income as  
                                ttttt ArHWI 1111 ++++ += .                                                    (6) 
Substituting (4) into (6) for tA  I get 
  )],,()1[( 11111 EDITCHWArrHWI tttttttttt −−+++= −++++ .                         (7) 
Noting that tC  and tH  appear in the period 1+t  asset accumulation constraint, the 
Lagrangean for the maximization problem can be written as: 
 
                                                 
3 The model presented here takes into account the realities of joint labor and capital income taxation and 
imposes no restrictions on the separability of the intertemporal budget constraint. 
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[ ]
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The first-order conditions are 
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where 
t
t
I
IT
∂
∂ )(
  is the marginal tax rate.  
If the tax function is nonlinear, from (9) and (10) and using the implicit function 
theorem, one gets the λ - constant consumption and hours demand functions (Heckman and 
MaCurdy (1980), MaCurdy (1981)).  Estimating the λ - constant labor supply function is a 
key method for empirical implementation in panel data, where λ  is treated as a individual- 
specific fixed effect.  In the presence of joint nonlinear labor and capital income taxation, 
this function depends on λ  and current as well as future prices and tax rates.  In this 
scenario,λ , the marginal utility of wealth, ceases to be a sufficient statistic for extra-period 
information.  Also, one can see from (9) and (10) that future taxes enter the opportunity cost 
for today's consumption and leisure through the term  
     

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           (11)       
This is because capital income on tA  is taxed in period 1+t .  Thus, there is intertemporal 
non-separability in the budget constraint induced by joint nonlinear capital and labor income 
taxation that creates a link between today's actions and tomorrow's relative prices.  Note that 
if joint labor and capital income taxation is ignored, the portion in the curly brackets in (9) 
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and (10) disappears, giving consumption and hours demand functions that have no between-
period dependence, and λ  becomes a valid sufficient statistic for extra-period information.  
One gets an empirically tractable labor supply function of the form: 
                                                 ),,( tttt XWHH λ= .                                             (12) 
 Indeed, with intertemporal separability of the budget set, (9) and (10) collapse to the usual 
within-period marginal rate of substitution condition: 
                                                      )],,(1[ ' EDITW
C
U
H
U
tt
t
t −=
∂
∂
∂
∂
− .                                        (13)    
Even though non-separability in the intertemporal budget constraint does not change the 
relative allocation within period, one can no longer use λ -constant labor supply function to 
get the levels of demand.  
As an alternative, I use two-stage budgeting, proposed by Gorman (1959), to solve 
the consumer’s problem.  In particular, Blomquist (1985) showed that in the presence of 
nonlinear taxation, the λ -constant labor supply function fails to account for the 
nonseparabilities in the budget constraint, but two-stage budgeting continues to be valid.  In 
the first-stage, the consumer allocates total expenditure across periods to equate the marginal 
utility of wealth.  In the second-stage, she takes the allocation of wealth between periods as 
given, and allocates between consumption and hours, like a standard static intratemporal 
problem, conditional on tA  and 1−tA .  In this framework, 1−tA  contains information on the 
past decisions and tA  represents the effect of future prices.  Thus, tA  and 1−tA  can be 
treated as sufficient statistics that capture the adjustment in the level of assets by the end of 
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the period.  Other functions of tA  and 1−tA  like full income or consumption-based full 
income also can function as sufficient statistics in the labor supply function.   
I choose to condition on full income, defined in Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) as                 
    ),,(1 EDITBAArY ttttt
C
t −+∆+= − ,                                  (14) 
where tB  is unearned non-asset income in period t.  This measure can be derived as follows.  
We can write the full income as 
                           ),,(*1 EDITLWBAArLWCM tttttttttt −++∆+=+≡ − ,                        (15) 
where L  is the total time endowment, tB , the unearned non-asset income, and other 
components are as defined before.  Rearrange to yield 
                                   ),,(*1 EDITHWBAArC tttttttt −++∆+= − .                                   (16) 
In this framework, the consumer’s problem in the first stage of the two-stage budgeting 
framework can be written as: 
{ }
),,(max
, tttHC
XHCU
tt
              (17) 
subject to 
tt
C
tt HWYC +=
*                                                      (18) 
where ),,(*1** EDITBAArY ttttt
C
t −+∆+= −  is the full income measure that captures the 
capability to transfer funds between periods through tA∆ , a component that is ignored in the 
static model.   
In a labor supply model with taxes and a piecewise-linear budget constraint, the 
after-tax wage is the slope of the budget segment on which the individual locates, and is the 
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appropriate price of leisure.  In this set up, the coefficient on the after-tax wage can be 
interpreted as the Marshallian elasticity, and compensated elasticities can be derived using 
the Slutsky equation (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).   
3.  Econometric Specification 
I assume a linear specification of the life-cycle consistent labor supply function,  
   ittiit
Cv
ititit XYH εµϑδβαω +++++=
* ,   (19) 
where the hours worked, *itH  , is a latent variable that is observed only for females who 
choose to work, itω  is the after-tax wage, 
Cv
itY , is the virtual full income, iϑ  is an 
individual-specific effect, tµ  is a time-specific effect and itε  is the error term that varies 
with both individuals and time.  In a model with nonlinear income taxation, both itω  and 
Cv
itY  are endogenous variables that may be correlated with either iϑ  or itε  or both.
4  The 
choice of a linear specification allows comparability of results to an overwhelming majority 
of labor supply studies that have found (19) to be a good first-order linear approximation to 
the labor supply function.  This labor supply function is consistent with the following 
underlying indirect utility function (Hausman (1981c)): 
{ } 











+−+= δ
β
ααω
β
βωω XYYv CvCv 1exp),( .            (20) 
In the labor supply equation (19), itX  is a vector of exogenous taste shifters, which 
consists of children and other demographic factors.5  In the context of female labor supply, 
                                                 
4 The virtual income is computed as )](*)([ tttCvtCvt ITIIYY −+= τ  where )( tIτ  is the marginal tax rate, tI  is the 
adjusted gross income and )( tIT  is the actual taxes calculated at tI  by integrating the marginal tax function. 
5 Mroz (1987) finds evidence that children are not endogenous in a female labor supply equation with taxes. 
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(19) is a censored regression model.  If the reservation wage is above the offered wage rate, 
the female does not work, resulting in a corner solution.6  If ),0(~ 2σε Nit , then (19) is the 
well known Tobit model with a limited dependent variable  
    *itit HH = if  0
* >itH     (21) 
      0=         otherwise.             (22) 
4.  Data 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) began in 1968, and is a longitudinal 
study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals (men, women, and children) and the 
family units in which they reside.  The sample consists of wives.  Women belonging to 
Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) subsample were excluded from the analysis sample.  
The final sample consists of 6,288 person-years of wives from the 1980-1987 PSID, for 
women who were in the sample for at least two years.  Table 1 gives the descriptive 
statistics on selected variables.  
Wages 
The PSID contains more than one measure of the wage rate.  One measure can be 
formed by dividing annual real earnings by the annual hours worked.  This measure has 
been found in the literature to induce division bias in labor supply estimates, yielding 
parameter estimates inconsistent with theory (Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999).7  I use a self-
reported measure of the hourly wage, using the methodology in Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), 
                                                 
6 Blundell and Meghir (1993) show that the Euler equation for consumption holds even in 
the presence of nonparticipation and nonseparability between consumption and leisure, 
provided the wages are replaced by the shadow value. 
7 A similar incidence of division bias has also been found in Engelhardt and Kumar (2003). 
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that does not require dividing annual labor income with annual hours, and is relatively free 
of division bias.   
Taxes 
I use NBER’s TAXSIM calculator to compute the marginal tax rate for each 
individual given her filing status, number of exemptions, and itemization status.  The 
marginal tax rate function is smoothed using a cubic polynomial.8  This marginal tax 
function is integrated to infer the actual taxes paid for every individual.  The details of the 
construction of the differentiable budget constraint using the smooth marginal tax rate 
function are described in the appendix.   
Income 
Non-labor income of the wife is estimated as the difference between family money 
income and the labor income of the wife.  Thus, wives' non-labor income includes labor 
income of their husbands.  The total labor income of the household is defined as the sum of 
head’s and wife’s labor income.  The adjusted gross income for the purposes of calculating 
the marginal tax rate is computed as the sum of total labor income of the household and the 
capital income.  This paper assumes that the wife, as the secondary earner in the household, 
chooses her labor supply after the husband has made his decision.  In a household with head 
and wife filing joint returns, the marginal tax rate faced by the wife is the tax on the joint 
labor and capital income of the household.  
Assets  
I use the methodology adopted by Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) to construct the asset 
measures for all the individuals in the sample.  Assets consist of liquid and illiquid assets.  
 
 
15
Liquid assets are the capitalized rent, interest, and dividend income, which are regularly 
collected by PSID.  The illiquid assets are computed from the difference between the house 
value and remaining principal amount.  The full income measure uses the asset variable as 
an input.  
5.  Estimation of the Wage Equation 
The hours equation in (19) is estimated over the full sample of wives, and has hourly 
wage as an explanatory variable.  Wages are observed only for women who work.  
Following the literature, I calculate wages for women out of the labor force as follows.9  To 
estimate the wage equation, I write the following two-equation system  
itiitit uxW ++= αβ      (23) 
and  
                                                         itiitit axd ++= ξδ
*                                                    (24) 
                                                          1=itd   if  0
* >itd                                                      (25)                                
                                                               = 0 otherwise                            (26)   
where itW  is the gross wage rate of the individual, iα  and iξ  are individual-specific fixed 
effects, and itu  and ita are mean zero and homoscedastic error terms, respectively.  Let ix  
represent the vector of all the leads and lags of itx  i.e. ),.....,,,( 321 iTiiii xxxxx = .  This 
                                                                                                                                                      
8 The details of this procedure are described in the Appendix. 
9 Using predicted wages for non-workers is standard in the literature on female labor supply with taxes. The 
primary condition for consistency is consistent estimates of the wage equation parameters (Wales and 
Woodland (1980). Some earlier researchers used OLS to estimate the wage equation (Hall, 1973; Rosen, 
1976). This strategy has been criticized on grounds of selectivity-bias in the wage equation. (Killingsworth and 
Heckman, 1986; Wales and Woodland, 1980). Many other studies use selectivity-bias adjusted wage 
predictions (Hausman, 1980; Bourgiugnon and Magnac, 1990; Colombino and Del Boca, 1990; Triest, 1990; 
Kaiser et al., 1992; van Soest et al., 1990). 
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approach allows for arbitrary correlation between itu  and ix .  
*
itd  is a latent variable that 
determines labor force participation.   
Wages are observed if 1=itd .  In a standard two-step selectivity-bias-correction 
procedure, the selection equation is estimated using Probit in the first step, and the wage 
equation is estimated with the inverse Mills ratio as a regressor in the second step (Heckman 
(1980)).  This is a Type II Tobit representation of the wage equation.  However, there is no a 
priori reason to ignore the information on hours of work.  A Type III Tobit model uses all 
available information on hours.  In this framework, the selection equation (24) is written 
with a censored dependent variable, such that the model becomes 
 itiitit axH ++= ξδ
*       (27) 
                                                        itit HH =
*   if 0* >itH                          (28) 
       =0 otherwise              (29)
  
 I correct for selection bias in the wage equation, using a correlated random effects approach 
suggested by Woolridge (1995). 10  In this framework, the wage equation has the following 
form.  
                                      itttitiititiit xxdxWE υφρβψυ )()1,,|( +++==                            (30) 
                                                 
10 Kyriazidou (1997) uses differencing under a conditional exchangeability assumption on the error term to 
eliminate the fixed effect as well as the selection bias term from the wage equation. Under certain regularity 
conditions, a two-step method gets rid of both the effects. In the first step, φ  in the participation equation is 
estimated using conditional fixed effects logit or any other consistent estimator. In the second step, ψ  is 
estimated semiparametrically, using a kernel-weighted least squares on first differences.  Using this estimator, 
one can get all the slope parameters but the constant is not identified. Therefore, I do not use this method to 
correct for selection bias to get the wage prediction because I need the constant to get the correct wage level. 
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Where ittt υφρ )( +  is the term arising due to a possible selection bias.  I use the Type III 
Tobit because it uses more information than a Type II Tobit model, which assumes that the 
selection indicator is unobserved.  An estimate of itυ  comes from the Tobit residuals by 
estimating (24).  A requirement for the correction of standard errors due to estimated 
regressors applies.11  
 I estimate a selectivity-bias-corrected log wage equation with the following variables 
as controls: non-labor income, a spline in age with knots at 35 and 45, a spline in education 
with knots at 7 and 11 years of education, a race dummy and city size.  This specification is 
in line with other female labor supply studies.12  The unobserved effect in the selection 
equation and the wage equation were modeled as a linear function of time-varying 
characteristics, which, in this case, happen to be non-labor income and children under six.   
For identification, I need an exclusion restriction.  I use children under six years of 
age.  Specifically in accordance with much of the existing literature in labor supply, I 
assume that children under six years of age have a strong effect on female labor force 
participation, but, conditional on participation, are uncorrelated with the female’s wage.  
 The estimates are presented in Table 2.  Column 1 presents the results using Type II 
Tobit and column 2 has the results for Type III Tobit.  Some differences in signs and 
magnitudes of coefficients are noticeable between columns 1 and 2.  Age after 45 has a 
                                                 
11 In several studies, the wage equation for females, estimated on a sample of workers, has been found to be 
relatively insensitive to selection bias (Heckman (1980), Hausman (1981)). So, first I tested for selection bias 
in the sample based on a procedure applicable to panel data, suggested in Wooldridge (1995). The coefficient 
on the estimated residuals is statistically significant with a t-statistic of 4.9. Thus, I rejected the null hypothesis 
that the estimates of the wage equation on the working sample will not be affected by selection bias. This test 
entails estimating the second- stage wage equation with fixed effects. The coefficients on the residuals follows 
a t-distribution under the null. 
12 I also estimated a wage equation with a quartic in age, education and all nonredundant interactions. The 
results did not change. 
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positive effect using the Type II Tobit while it has a negative effect in the Type III Tobit.  
High school education has much stronger effect using Type III.  Bad health has a negative 
effect on wage using Type III Tobit while a positive effect using Type II Tobit.  Table 2 
clearly shows that the results using the two models are quite different.13  
6.  Estimation of the Hours Equation  
6.1  Identification  
 Estimation of the hours equation is plagued by problems of endogeneity.  First, in a 
nonlinear budget set framework, the marginal tax rate is endogenous to the choice of hours 
of work.  Second, as noted by Eissa (1995), the marginal tax rate is a nonlinear function of 
income and family size, and may be correlated with underlying tastes for work which also 
may be correlated with income and family size.  Third, the gross wage itself may be 
endogenous, because it may be correlated with unobserved tastes for work.   
 Most previous studies on taxes and labor supply have used cross-sectional variation 
in marginal tax rates to identify the effect of taxes.  Because the marginal tax rate depends 
on choices that are correlated with labor supply, there may be insufficient independent 
cross-sectional variation in tax rates to identify the tax effect on labor supply.  Plausibly 
exogenous time-series variation generated by the tax reforms in the 1980s is relatively 
underexploited in studies that employ nonlinear budget set techniques.  There were two 
major tax policy reforms in the 1980’s: the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 (ERTA) and 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86).   Specifically, Eissa (1995) estimated a reduced-form 
specification in a difference-in-difference framework using cross-sectional and time-series 
                                                 
13 I interpret the coefficients assuming that the individual effects are correlated only with the lags and leads of 
time-varying regressors. If this restriction is not imposed, the coefficients on time invariant regressors are not 
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variation in marginal tax rates from TRA86.  However, this study did not explicitly take into 
account the nonlinear budget set faced by individuals.  Eissa (1995) used the TRA86 in a 
natural experiment framework to identify the labor supply effects of taxes on wives married 
to husbands at or above 99th percentile of the income distribution.  She used two different 
control groups; wives married to husbands between the 75th and 80th percentiles of the 
income distribution; and those married to husbands between 90th and 95th percentiles of the 
income distribution. 14    
Using panel data, this paper circumvents these problems by using both cross-
sectional and time-series variation in tax rates over the 1980s to identify the effect of taxes 
on labor supply.  To get a sense of the time-series variation in the 1980s, Figure 2 graphs the 
federal marginal tax rates by real adjusted gross income for a household filing married 
jointly, with two children and no age exemption from 1980 to 1987.  It can be seen that there 
was substantial variation in marginal tax rates during this period.  
One pitfall of the natural experiment approach is that the behavioral parameters are 
not identified.  In particular, the best one can do is to identify a weighted substitution-
income effect (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).  Therefore, I follow a structural approach 
where I explicitly seek to identify the parameters of the indirect utility function (20) by 
estimating the labor supply equation (19).  I treat both the after-tax wage and virtual full 
income as endogenous.  Also, the virtual income is constructed using a lump-sum transfer 
that depends on the marginal tax rate, which is endogenous.  I instrument for them using the 
                                                                                                                                                      
separately identified from the individual specific effect (Wooldridge, 1995). 
14 Blundell et al. (1998) explicitly took into account kinks in the budget set and used education and cohort 
interacted with year, as exclusion restrictions to identify the parameters of the labor supply equation with 
British data. Both these studies have been conducted using repeated cross-sections. 
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net wage and virtual income constructed from a synthetic tax rate.15 The identifying 
assumption is that this synthetic marginal tax rate is correlated with the observed marginal 
tax rate but is uncorrelated with hours of work.  Four types of synthetic tax rates were used 
to construct the instruments for the after-tax wage rate: (1) the husband’s first-dollar tax rate 
on earnings; (2) the husband’s last-dollar tax rate on earnings; (3) the maximum state 
marginal tax rate for a synthetic tax payer (earning $350,000); and, (4) the maximum total of 
federal and state tax rate for a synthetic tax payer (earning $350,000).   To make the 
instrument for after-tax wage and virtual full income, I also replaced the gross wage and full 
income with the twice lagged value of gross wage and full income, respectively.16   After 
constructing the synthetic marginal tax rates, I instrument tω   with a synthetic after-tax 
wage rate syntω ,  where 
                                                   )1(ˆ 2
syn
tt
syn
t W τω −= −  ,                                                     (31) 
with 2ˆ −tW , the twice lagged predicted gross wage rate and, 
syn
tτ , the synthetic marginal tax 
rate. 
Analogously, I instrument CvtY  with 
synCv
tY , which is constructed by replacing the 
corresponding marginal tax rates and taxes with the synthetic counterparts and using a 
synthetic twice lagged value of full income in place of contemporaneous full income  
                               ])()*[(ˆ 2
syn
t
syn
t
syn
t
C
t
Cv
t ITIYY
syn
−+= − τ ,                                         (32) 
                                                 
15 In the literature on nonlinear budget set estimation with taxes using maximum likelihood, gross wage and 
full income are treated as exogenous. However, both of these could be endogenous in a lifecycle model due to 
human capital accumulation factors. 
16 Under the assumption of rational expectations, everything in the information set at time 1−t  and before is 
exogenous.   So the twice-lagged value of the gross wage and full income are considered exogenous are valid 
for making instruments. 
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 where syntI  is the synthetic adjusted gross income and 
C
tY 2ˆ − , the twice lagged synthetic full 
income.17  These synthetic tax rates do not depend on choice of hours of work and hence can 
be treated as exogenous.18    
6.2 Estimation 
The hours equation (19) is estimated using both random-effects and fixed-effects 
estimation techniques.  The choice of estimation technique depends upon the assumptions 
regarding the correlation between the individual-specific effects and other regressors.  In 
uncorrelated random effects models, the fixed effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the regressors, i.e., 0),( =iti xCov ϑ .  In models that have come to be described as correlated 
random effects models, 0),( ≠iti xCov ϑ , and the correlation between iϑ  and other regressors 
is modeled as a linear projection on all the lags and leads of itx .  However, in the latter 
framework, the regressors itx  are treated as strictly exogenous.  The most promising way to 
account for the individual specific fixed effects is to difference them away, but in nonlinear 
models it is not possible to apply simple differencing techniques to get rid of the fixed 
effects.19  This leads to semiparametric estimators derived in Honore (1992) that use a clever 
trimming to difference away the fixed effects.   
                                                 
17 I call CtY 2ˆ − synthetic because I removed the supposedly endogenous components from this measure of full 
income, e.g.,  taxes paid and transfer income. 
18 I test for the existence of weak instruments by doing a partial F-test on the instruments in the reduced form 
regression. The null of weak instruments is consistently rejected. The partial F-statistic on instruments in the 
after tax wage regression is 241.83 and that in CvY regression is 527.67. Both these statistics pass the rule of 
thumb tests presented in Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1994) and Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002).  As a note of 
caution, both these results may not apply to nonlinear models. 
19 In nonlinear models, differencing to get rid of the fixed effects is not a viable alternative. A sufficient 
statistic for Logit and Poisson models is available. However, for the Tobit model a sufficient statistic to 
condition out the iϑ s is not available. The only way to deal with fixed effects is to estimate them as 
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6.3  Cross Section Results 
Table 4 presents estimates of the labor supply parameters treating 8 years of data on 
married females as independent cross sections and ignoring the individual-specific effects.  
Table 4 uses the predicted wage from the Type III Tobit model.  The Amemiya Generalized 
Least Squares (AGLS) estimator of Newey (1987) is used to estimate the Tobit hours model 
with instrumental variables.  In addition to after-tax wage and virtual full income, other 
controls include the number of children between one and two years old, number of children 
between three and five years old, number of children between six and thirteen years old, a 
dummy for self-reported bad health, and a quartic in age.   
The results are quite consistent with theory.  In particular, the Slutsky restrictions are 
satisfied in each year.  The uncompensated wage elasticity is estimated between 1.8 and 2.5.  
These estimates are close to the higher end of results found in the existing literature, which 
primarily uses a Type II Tobit model to predict wages. 20  The income elasticity ranges from 
-0.21 to -0.31.  Leisure appears as a normal good in each cross-section.  The compensated 
elasticities are between 1.8 to 2.5.  On the intensive margin, compensated elasticities range 
from 1.2 to 1.8.21  
                                                                                                                                                      
parameters. In datasets where the time dimension is fixed, these parameters grow with sample size, giving rise 
to incidental parameters problem as found by Neyman and Scott (1948). The inconsistency induced in 
estimating the iϑ s, due to incidental parameters problem is transmitted to γ  due to the nonlinearities. 
However, the amount of inconsistency decreases as ∞→T  so that at least for larger panels the amount of 
inconsistency will not be large. This approach has been adopted in Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and 
Jakubson (1988) to estimate labor supply functions. 
20  At the intensive margin, these elasticities are between 1.2 to 1.8. The elasticities on the participation margin 
range from 0.6 to 1. 
21 These estimates can be compared with static specifications estimated in the literature on estimation of female 
labor supply tax effects in a nonlinear budget set environment, using the PSID. Hausman (1981) estimated 
wage and income elasticities for females working full time of 1 and -0.5 respectively. Triest (1990) estimated 
uncompensated wage elasticities of 0.9 and 1.12 for one error and two error model respectively, using 
Maximum Likelihood.  The income elasticities estimated here are much closer to the estimates of Triest 
(1990), whose estimates were between -0.15 to -0.31. Rosen (1976) estimated an uncompensated elasticity of 
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6.4  Random Effects Estimation with Instrumental Variables 
In column 1, of Table 5 I present results for the pooled Tobit model with 
instrumental variables.   The results of random effects model with instrumental variables are 
presented in column 2 of Table 5.22  The pooled Tobit and the random effects results are 
very similar. From the random effects model, the parameter estimates for α  and δ  are 453 
and -0.0018, respectively.  The uncompensated wage elasticity evaluated at the sample mean 
is 1.37.  The signs of the wage and income elasticities are as expected, with leisure 
appearing as a normal good.  The Slutsky restrictions are satisfied in all specifications.  The 
compensated elasticity at the sample mean is 1.37.  Random effects estimation with 
instrumental variables yields remarkably robust estimates of the effects of children and 
health on labor supply.23   
6.5  Semiparametric Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
The incidental parameters problem can induce inconsistency in the estimates of 
parameters of interest in a parametric fixed effect model.  The maximum likelihood 
estimation of Tobit models is also susceptible to biases from heteroscedasticity and 
nonnormality of the true error distributions.  Some semiparametric estimators deal with both 
                                                                                                                                                      
2.3 and an income elasticity of -0.42. Hausman and Ruud (1986) estimated wage and income elasticities of 
0.76 and -0.36, respectively. Thus, my estimates obtained from estimating a static model using the cross-
sections are qualitatively similar to the previous literature. I also attempted to replicate Triest (1990) for the 
1983 cross-section. A 95% confidence band around my parameter estimates substantially overlaps the 
confidence band around estimates in Triest (1990). So using cross-section in a static framework, I am broadly 
able to replicate the estimates found elsewhere.  
22 See Appendix 2 for details of estimation 
23The coefficient on children between 1-2 years old ranges from -303 to -346. This translates into a reduction 
of 140 annual hours of work for each additional child between 1-3 years of age. An additional child between 3-
5 years old reduces labor supply by about 100 hours in the richest specification. A child between 6-13 years of 
age reduces hours worked by much smaller 36 hours. As expected, I find evidence of an effect on labor supply 
that is declining in the age of children. Conditional on the number of children in these three age ranges, the 
effect of total number of children is not statistically significant. On average, bad health status reduces labor 
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of these problems by using a trimming mechanism to restore the symmetry of the error 
distribution that is spoiled by censoring or truncation, and then use a least squares or a least 
absolute deviation estimator.  The distribution of the error term is left unspecified.   
 In this paper, I apply the trimmed least squares (TLS) estimator and trimmed least 
absolute deviation (TLAD) estimators proposed in Honore (1992).24  The estimates are 
presented in column 3 and 4 of Table 5.  The coefficient on after-tax wage is estimated at 
344.6 using TLS estimator and 360.2 using TLAD estimator.  Leisure is estimated as a 
normal good.25  The implied compensated elasticities are 1.04 and 1.11 from TLS and 
TLAD, respectively. There is no obvious way to deal with endogeneity in Honore's 
estimator.  One of the shortcomings of this estimator is that regressors are treated as strictly 
exogenous.26  Nevertheless, if the endogeneity of net wage and virtual income operates only 
through the time invariant individual specific effect, the estimates will be consistent.  Again, 
the semiparametric estimates confirm the finding of a strong wage effect.   
6.6  Semiparametric Selection Corrected Hours Equation using Kyriazidou (1997) 
Female labor supply estimates have been found to be sensitive not only to the  
estimates of the wage equation and the use of the instrument set but also to the type of Tobit 
model.  In particular, selection-bias-corrected or truncated specifications are known to yield 
results different from censored specifications (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Triest, 
1990).  I also estimate a selection-bias-corrected specification.  In the following estimation 
procedure, I do not assume any distribution for the individual effect or the time varying error 
                                                                                                                                                      
supply by 110 hours.  I include health as a control as most other studies do e.g. Triest (1990). I recognize that it 
may be endogenous in a labor supply equation. 
24 The estimation of TLS was carried out using a GAUSS program available from Honore’s website. 
25 The coefficients on children entered significantly and with expected negative signs.  The wage coefficient 
was quite robust to different specifications and to addition of time and region dummies in the model. 
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term and hence avoid problems due to heteroscedasticity or nonnormality of the error term 
which contaminates the estimates in a Tobit model.  This procedure has been found to be 
sensitive to the choice of bandwidth constant h .27  I employ the plug-in method to choose h .  
I use a second-order bias-reducing kernel.  For the kernel function, I use the Gaussian 
kernel.  
Kyriazidou’s estimator uses consistent first-stage parameter estimates from the 
selection equation.  I estimate a selection equation for the probability of labor force 
participation assuming that the errors in the selection equation are distributed i.i.d. logistic 
and adopt a fixed effect conditional ML estimation method.28  In the selection equation, the 
after-tax wage and virtual full income should be treated as endogenous.  Estimators for a 
binary choice selection equation with endogenous regressors are not readily available, so I 
use fdω  and 
Cv
fdY as regressors in the selection equation.
29   Identification in this model also  
requires an exclusion restriction that appears in the selection equation but is absent from the 
main equation.  Finding an exclusion restriction in the labor supply context can be very hard.  
I experiment with family size and union dummy as potential exclusion restrictions.  The 
results were similar using either.30  
                                                                                                                                                      
26 An instrumental variable estimator of this type is Honore and Hu (2001). 
27 The details of the estimation procedure are available from the author on request. A STATA program to 
implement the estimator is also available. 
28 I have a choice between the conditional maximum likelihood approach (Chamberlain, 1984), the semi 
parametric maximum score estimator (Manski, 1987). While the conditional ML approach assumes a 
distribution for the error term and is n - consistent and asymptotically normal, the semiparametric estimator 
converges at a rate slower than n . Chamberlain (1992) shows that with bounded support of the variables in 
the selection equation, identification of the selection equation parameters is possible only in the logistic case. 
Even if we assume unbounded support, n  consistency is achieved only in the logistic case. 
29 This method is also adopted in Charlier, Melenberg and van Soest (1997). 
30 The estimation of the selection equation yielded positive and statistically significant coefficient on first- 
dollar net wage fdω . The coefficient on first-dollar virtual full income 
Cv
fdY  was negative and statistically 
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The results for the hours equation are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 5. 
Column 5 presents the parameter estimates without using instrumental variables for net 
wage and virtual full income and just estimating the selection-bias-corrected labor supply 
equation by weighted least squares, using the kernel density estimate of the selection index, 
as weights.  The uncompensated wage elasticity is estimated at 1.24. The estimate of the 
income elasticity is -0.002.     Column 6, presents estimates using instrumental variables for 
net wage and virtual income. The uncompensated wage effect is about 451.  The coefficient 
on virtual full income is -0.0002 and statistically insignificant.  Slutsky condition is satisfied 
and leisure appears as a normal good.  The compensated elasticity is estimated at 1.35.  The 
estimates are moderately sensitive to the bandwidth constant h .31    The estimated net wage 
and full income coefficients are close to the estimates from random effects Tobit model with 
instrumental variables.  This suggests that the random effects Tobit model may not be 
misspecified.    
6.7 Sensitivity to Instruments, Functional form, and Wage Measure 
In the results discussed so far, I have used the husband’s last-dollar marginal tax rate 
as an instrument for the wife’s observed marginal tax rate.  The estimates will be 
inconsistent if husband’s last-dollar marginal tax rate itself is endogenous.  Therefore, I 
estimated the labor supply elasticities using the maximum state marginal tax rate and 
maximum federal plus state marginal tax rate as instruments for the observed marginal tax 
                                                                                                                                                      
insignificant. The signs on other variables like children and health were as expected. Children and bad health 
had a negative effect on probability of labor force participation. Overall, I find theoretically consistent 
estimates in the selection equation. 
31 I experimented with a grid of possible values. However, I present the results for the bandwidth constant, 
which gave me the best bias standard error tradeoff for the estimates. Over a range of bandwidth constants, I 
found that point estimates declined with the value of bandwidth while the precision increased. I subjectively 
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rate.  These instruments were constructed by running the sample through NBER’s TAXSIM 
by assigning an adjusted gross income of $350,000 to every individual.  I also constructed a 
more synthetic version of this instrument by running a hypothetical individual who is 
married with two children, filing jointly, and with no age exemption. This addresses the 
concern that family size may be endogenous with the marginal tax rate.  The results 
presented in Table 6 are fairly robust to the use of these instruments. Both parametric and 
semiparametric results did not change by much. 
Many researchers have used predicted wages only for non-workers, while using 
observed gross wages for workers in their estimation.  I examine the sensitivity of estimates 
due to this methodology.  The results are presented in Table 7.  I find that the results are 
sensitive to using this method.  The estimated compensated elasticities are now lower. Also, 
the parameter estimates are not robust across estimators.  The estimated compensated 
elasticity from the random effects estimator with instrumental variables is 0.67. Using the 
semiparametric TLS and TLAD, estimators the estimates of compensated elasticities go 
down to about 0.4.  This may be due the endogeneity of observed gross wage.  Kyriazidou’s 
estimator did not yield statistically significant estimates for a broad range of bandwidth 
constant h. However, leisure is still estimated as a normal good and the Slutsky condition is 
satisfied across all estimators. 
I also checked the sensitivity of the results with respect to functional form 
assumptions for the labor supply function. In particular, I used a quadratic labor supply 
function. The top panel of Table 8 presents the comparison using predicted wages from the 
                                                                                                                                                      
chose the value that yielded sufficient precision.  The estimates remain practically unchanged for bandwidth 
constant higher than 5.  The results did not vary with the choice of the order of kernel.  
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wage equation for everybody in the sample.  The estimated elasticities are about 20% larger 
than those estimated with a linear labor supply function. The compensated elasticity 
increased from 1.67 to 2.03.   The bottom panel uses predicted wages only for non-workers. 
These results did not change by much.  The compensated elasticity using both the functional 
forms are close to 1. 
7.  Deadweight Loss from Taxes 
 I now use the parameter estimates to estimate deadweight loss from taxes. In the 
nonlinear budget set estimation with taxes, Triest (1990) found that taxes reduce labor 
supply by 30% in the censored specifications he estimated.  Hausman (1981) found that the 
tax system reduces labor supply by 8.5%.  He found a mean deadweight loss as a percentage 
of tax revenue of 28.7% for husbands.  For wives, he estimated deadweight loss from 4.6% 
for a mean wage of 2.11 dollars to 35.7% for a mean wage of 5.79 dollars.  He found that 
the estimated deadweight loss rises with the market wage rate.  For wives he found a 
deadweight loss of 18.4% of the tax revenue.  Hausman (1981) noted that tax treatment of 
married persons creates substantial deadweight loss for working wives.  A wife who worked 
full time at $4 an hour and whose husband’s income in 1975 was $10,000 would face a 
deadweight loss of 58.1% of tax revenue.  From these calculations, it appears that the 
deadweight loss for wives is very strongly related to husband’s income.  The higher the 
husband’s income – for a wife filing jointly – the higher the marginal tax rate and higher the 
potential for deadweight loss as it rises with the square of the tax rate.     
For the linear labor supply equation (19), the compensating variation can be written 
as (Hausman, 1981): 
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The exact deadweight loss is easily calculated after subtracting the tax revenue from the 
compensating variation.  
First, I use estimates from the random-effects instrumental variables estimator 
presented in Table 5 to calculate the exact deadweight loss from an across-the-board 20% 
tax imposition.32  This gives us an estimate of the magnitude of potential distortion caused 
by taxes.  From a 20% tax imposition, I estimate a compensating variation (CV) of 625 
dollars.33  The change in consumer surplus (CS) is marginally higher than the compensating 
variation as expected from theory.  Indeed the difference between CV and CS is extremely 
small which is contrary to what was found in Hausman (1981).  In this paper, it is small 
because of the inconsequential size of the income effect.  The magnitude of the deadweight 
loss as a fraction of tax revenue raised gives us a measure of the economic costs of taxation 
(Hausman, 1981).34  
Next, I compare the efficiency of the existing progressive tax system and 
proportional tax system which yields the same tax revenue.  Because deadweight loss is 
                                                 
32 Specifically I measure the deadweight loss from a 20% increase in the current price of leisure. This follows 
standard practice in this literature. 
33 This means that a consumer will be required to be compensated $625 to keep her at the same level of utility 
as before a 20% tax imposition. At the sample means of hours, income and other explanatory variables, it 
implies a deadweight loss of 186.57 dollars. 
34The validity of the exact deadweight loss calculations using the indirect utility function approach depends 
upon the existence of the said utility function. Vartia’s (1983) method does not rely on the existence of such 
indirect utility function and calculates the required compensation by numerically solving the first order 
differential equation obtained from the Roy’s Identity. To check the sensitivity of the results, I also applied 
Vartia’s approach. The results were almost identical.  
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proportional to the square of the tax rate, a progressive tax system is likely to create 
substantially higher deadweight loss than a proportional tax system.35   
Column 1 of Table 9 presents estimates of the effect of the existing tax system on the 
deadweight loss.  I find that deadweight loss varies a great deal in the sample.  Due to the 
presence of outliers, I focus on the median estimates.  Under the progressive tax system, the 
median compensating variation is $4951.  Thus the median household would need to be 
compensated $4951 to achieve the pre-tax level of utility under the progressive tax system.     
The deadweight loss for the median household is $1588 – about 57% of tax revenue.  
Column 2 of Table 9 shows the calculations for a new tax regime in which the same revenue 
was collected using a much simpler and proportional tax structure.  My simulations suggest 
that this switch would lead to efficiency gains.  The compensating variation for the median 
household is $4821. This implies a deadweight loss of $1458, i.e., 49% of tax revenue. 
8.  Intertemporal Preference Parameters 
So far in the paper, I have concentrated on within-period elasticities.  It is well 
known that an anticipated or evolutionary wage change with constant marginal utility of 
wealth (λ ), induces a larger labor supply response than Hicksian or Marshallian elasticities 
(MaCurdy, 1981; Browning, 1985).  This is because with λ  being constant, a change in 
wages is only due to a movement along the given life-cycle profile, known at the beginning 
of the lifetime, and, hence, there is no wealth effect associated with a λ -constant wage 
change.  On the contrary, the income- or utility-constant wage changes contain a wealth 
                                                 
35 I calculated the actual tax paid on wife’s labor income by assuming that she makes the decision to work after 
the decision of the husband, based on a secondary earner model. I could easily get an estimate of the taxes paid 
by running the income of every household through TAXSIM, first before adding wife’s labor income and then 
after adding her labor income. The difference between the taxes paid estimates from the two runs gives us the 
taxes paid on wife’s income.  
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effect.  Therefore, λ -constant (also known as Frisch) elasticities are important for analysis 
of the effect of anticipated change in wage (Browning, 1985).  The Frisch elasticity can be 
obtained from intertemporal preference parameters.  
Intertemporal preference parameters are estimated following the approach used in 
Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) and Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993).  Writing the Box-Cox 
transformation of the indirect utility as 
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 Where ),( Cvt Yv ω  is the indirect utility function (20) and tσ , the intertemporal preference 
parameter that is allowed to vary with a set of demographics, tX , such that  
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From the maximization of the consumers lifetime expected utility, the Euler equation for the 
marginal utility of wealth can be written as: 
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where tr  is the after-tax interest rate.  This equation represents the first stage of the two- 
stage budgeting procedure and intuitively states that the consumer chooses consumption and 
labor supply such that marginal utility of wealth in period t  equals the discounted value of 
marginal utility of wealth in period 1+t .  tε   is the forecast error. 
From taking a log of  (36) and first differencing and substituting the marginal utility 
of wealth, by differentiating (20) and substituting for tλ , we get the following equation, 
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Like Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) and Blundell et al. (1993), I estimate equation (37) using 
GMM.  I allow the error to be serially correlated and use the Newey-West correction to the 
covariance matrix.  I use iterative GMM where the variance-covariance matrix is re-
estimated at each iteration.   
In the intertemporal labor supply model I estimate, I allow the intertemporal 
preference parameters to vary with children, assets, and health.  I treat all the regressors as 
endogenous and follow Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) and Blundell, Meghir and Neves (1993) 
in using the lagged values of gross wage, after-tax wage, virtual full income, asset, virtual 
assets, self-reported bad health, the net after-tax real interest rate, age, interactions between 
education and age, home ownership dummy, and number of children as instruments.  I use 
the third and fourth lag of all these variables as instruments.  The results of the estimation of 
the intertemporal preference parameters are presented in Table 10. I find that assets have a 
positive and economically significant effect on intertemporal preferences. Higher assets 
increase intertemporal substitution. I find that young children reduce intertemporal 
substitution.  The effect of older children and the total number of children have a negative 
but statistically insignificant impact on intertemporal substitution.  The effect of poor health 
on intertemporal substitution is negative and significant.  The common discount rate is 
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estimated to be 0.05.36  Even though the signs of the estimates of the intertemporal 
preference parameters are as expected, they imply an intertemporal labor supply elasticity 
that is very close to the compensated elasticity, i.e., 1.5. 
Conclusion 
I undertake lifecycle-consistent estimation of female labor supply parameters with 
taxes, in the presence of joint labor and capital income taxation.  I account for corner 
solutions and censored outcomes by applying Tobit models to panel data with individual- 
specific effects.  The nonlinear budget sets created by taxes are fully taken into account by 
constructing a differentiable budget constraint.  Using a panel of married females from the 
PSID, this study finds that labor supply elasticities are sensitive to use of panel data as well 
the choice of estimators.  I estimate both random effects and semiparametric fixed effects 
estimators using instrumental variables and find results consistent with theory.  In particular, 
Slutsky restrictions are satisfied for practically every one in the sample.  Random effects 
estimation with instrumental variables yields a compensated elasticity of 1.4, suggesting 
strong distortionary effects from taxation.  Estimates from semiparametric panel selection- 
bias-corrected hours equation with instrumental variables yield compensated elasticity of 
1.35.  I calculate exact deadweight loss from income taxation and estimate economic cost of 
taxes of about 30% of tax revenue collected, for a 20% tax imposition.  For the median 
household, the progressive tax system from 1980-1987 resulted in a deadweight loss of 57% 
of tax revenue.  My simulations indicate that a revenue neutral proportional tax would 
reduce the deadweight loss to 49% of tax revenue.  I use GMM to estimate intertemporal 
                                                 
36 The Sargan statistic for the test of overidentification is 0.79 which under the null of valid orthogonality 
conditions has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of excluded instruments 
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preference parameters efficiently.  My estimate of Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1.5. 
The deadweight loss calculations do not take into account general equilibrium effects. I also 
do not model endogenous human capital formation which is an area of active research 
(Heckman, Lochner and Taber, 1998).   These are possible extensions to be explored in 
future.  
                                                                                                                                                      
which in this case is 13.  I cannot reject the null that the orthogonality conditions are statisfied. 
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Figure 2: Federal Marginal Tax Rates Rates:1980-87
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
(Standard deviation in parentheses, Median in square bracket) 
 
Variable Full Sample Workers Non-workers
    
Hours 1007.99 1409.69 0.00 
 (870.75) (702.87) (0.00) 
 [1024.00] [1540.00] [0.00] 
    
Gross Wage 5.91 8.22 0.00 
 (6.07) (5.70) (0.00) 
 [5.26] [7.25] [0.00] 
    
After-Tax Wage 3.89 4.30 2.86 
 (1.85) (1.94) (1.04) 
 [3.57] [4.10] [2.70] 
    
Virtual Full income  43434.89 41703.35 47779.82 
 (45614.99) (44604.80) (47792.50) 
 [39542.02] [38542.77] [42465.34] 
    
Assets 80268.54 77769.98 86538.20 
 (91226.67) (84138.6) (106730.91) 
 [58840.77] [57922.41] [61823.80] 
    
Number of Children 1-2 years 0.14 0.11 0.19 
 (0.38) (0.34) (0.45) 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
    
Number of Children 3-5 years 0.20 0.18 0.24 
 (0.44) (0.42) (0.49) 
 [0] [0.00] [0.00] 
    
Number of Children 6-13 years 0.68 0.72 0.60 
 (0.89) (0.90) (0.84) 
 [0] [0.00] [0.00] 
    
Total Number of children 1.38 1.40 1.35 
 (1.22) (1.20) (1.25) 
 [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] 
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Table 1: (continued)  
 
Variable Full Sample Workers Non-workers 
    
Family Size 3.70 3.70 3.71 
 (1.24) (1.22) (1.28) 
 [4] [4.00] [4.00] 
    
Marginal Tax Rate 0.37 0.38 0.34 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) 
 [0.38] [0.39] [0.37] 
    
First-Dollar Tax Rate 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] 
    
Belongs to Union 0.09 0.13 0.01 
    
Owns Home 0.89 0.89 0.89 
    
Age 41.43 40.80 42.83 
 (8.42) (8.10) (9.00) 
 [40.00] [39.00] [42.00] 
    
White 0.92 0.92 0.92 
    
Education 12.83 13.00 12.33 
 (2.31) (2.28) (2.20) 
 [12.00] [12.00] [12.00] 
 
Note: Gross wage is the observed gross wage.  After-tax wage is 
the after tax predicted wage from wage equation. After-tax 
Wage, Virtual Full Income, and Assets are expressed in 1987
dollars.  
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates of the Correlated Random Effects Two-Step 
Selection-Corrected Wage Equation. (Dependent Variable: Gross Wage) 
 
Note: The dependent variable is gross wage per hour. The standard errors are not corrected for  two-
step estimation so should be viewed as lower bound. The regression was estimated on 6342 person-
years of observations from years 1978-1987. Estimation was done using correlated random effects 
estimator of Wooldridge (1995).  Other controls in the second-step regression include the inverse 
Mills ratio, time interacted inverse Mills ratio, all leads and lags of non-labor income, city size, and 
race. Age and education variables were included as spline. Accordingly Age35=Age-35 if Age>35 
and =0 if Age<35. Age 45, Educ7 and Ecuc11 are defined analogously. 
 (1) (2) 
 Type II Tobit Model Type III Tobit Model 
Non-labor Income 8.71e-06 3.93e-06 
 (1.74) (0.82) 
   
Age 0.062 0.124 
 (1.49) (3.31) 
   
Age35 -0.031 -0.070 
 (0.52) (1.28) 
   
Age45 0.005 -0.108 
 (0.10) (2.26) 
   
Education -0.196 0.072 
 (0.51) (0.20) 
   
Education7 0.232 0.016 
 (0.54) (0.04) 
   
Education11 0.730 0.926 
 (5.34) (7.08) 
   
Self –Reported Health Status 0.649 -0.400 
 (2.28) (1.56) 
   
R- Squared 0.13 0.20 
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Table 3.  Married-Women Labor Supply Results 
(Dependent Variable: Labor Supply) 
 
 
Authors Uncompensated 
Wage elasticity 
Income 
Elasticity 
Compensated 
Elasticity 
    
Ashworth/Ulph (1981) 0.19 –0.14  
    
Hausman (1981) 0.91 –0.50  
    
Nakamura/Nakamura (1981), United 
States 
–0.16 –0.05  
    
Nakamura/Nakamura (1981), Canada –0.3 –0.19  
    
Rosen (1976) 2.3 –0.42  
    
Hausman/Rudd (1984) 0.76 –0.36  
    
Triest (1990) Censored:0.86-1.12 
Truncated:0.21-
0.28 
-0.31--0.33 
-0.15--0.17 
 
    
Heckman (1980) 2.00-6.61   
    
Mroz (1987) 1.09-1.97   
    
Zabalza (1983) (ordered Probit) 1.59 0.23  
    
Arufat and Zabalza (1986) 2.03 -0.21  
    
Moffitt (1984) 0.43 -0.28  
    
Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1998) Workers:0.307 
Nonworkers: 
 0.81 
0.17 
    
Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998) No children:0.14 
Y Child 0-2:0.2 
Y Child 3-4:0.37 
Y Child 5-10:0.13 
0 
-0.19 
-0.17 
-0.1 
0.14 
0.30 
0.43 
0.17 
Eissa (1995) Participation: 0.4-
0.6 
Hours:0.8-1 
  
 
 
 
Table 4: Cross-sectional Instrumental Variable Tobit Estimates using Cross Section 1980-1987 
(Dependent Variable: Annual Hours of Work) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
(a) Parameter Estimates         
         
After Tax Wage 466.52 556.56 618.06 565.25 453.20 445.25 434.31 423.69 
 (18.66) (20.73) (18.57) (20.56) (18.77) (20.75) (19.72) (19.38) 
         
Virtual Non-labor Income -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 
 (4.20) (5.55) (4.84) (5.19) (6.32) (9.09) (7.15) (7.60) 
         
Number of Children 1-2 Years -934.52 -1,234.78 -1,200.31 -1,395.02 -1,179.31 -1,039.70 -829.96 -578.34 
 (10.70) (12.93) (11.17) (12.76) (11.70) (10.14) (8.02) (4.55) 
         
Number of Children 3-5 Years -546.36 -550.01 -549.92 -1,021.77 -979.08 -986.45 -1,077.43 -1,072.62 
 (7.16) (6.86) (5.91) (11.61) (11.41) (12.08) (11.53) (10.53) 
         
Number of Children 6-13 Years 55.84 17.42 -96.33 -301.60 -267.85 -268.86 -359.99 -408.67 
 (0.95) (0.29) (1.42) (4.99) (4.69) (5.00) (6.43) (6.49) 
         
Total Number of Children 36.13 58.32 107.59 187.09 160.15 135.93 99.16 70.27 
 (0.76) (1.21) (1.95) (3.69) (3.34) (2.96) (2.14) (1.37) 
         
Health -665.69 -669.61 -594.32 -576.75 -420.43 -565.58 -661.13 -596.76 
 (6.05) (5.87) (4.76) (5.70) (4.74) (7.35) (7.57) (6.92) 
         
(b) Elasticities         
         
Uncompensated Wage Elasticity 2.24 2.35 2.53 2.32 1.82 2.14 1.78 1.90 
         
Income Elasticity -.27 -.30 -.28 -.27 -.21 -.37 -.26 -.36 
         
Compensated Elasticity 2.26 2.39 2.56 2.35 1.84 2.18 1.81 1.94 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. The number of observations range from 872-892 in different years. All columns  
include a quartic in age and family size as controls. Elasticities are evaluated at sample means. 
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Table 5: Parameter Estimates from Panel Data estimation 
(Dependent Variable: Annual Hours of Work) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooled Tobit  With IV 
Random Effects 
With IV  TLS TLAD 
Semiparametric 
(OLS) 
Semiparametric 
(IV) 
(a) Parameter Estimates       
       
After tax wage 477.40 453.00 344.60 360.20 415.20 451.40 
 (51.71) (33.56) (28.63) (35.47) (50.4) (4.87) 
       
Virtual full income -0.0051 -0.0018 -0.00001 -0.0009 -0.00001 -0.0002 
 (-2.84) (-0.98) (-0.0093) (-0.0018) (0.95) (0.35) 
       
Number of Children 1-2 years -451.60 -458.80 -329.10 -352.70 -140.00 -155.90 
 (-13.96) (19.5) (7.36) (6.2) (2.78) (2.78) 
       
Number of Children 3-5 years -322.87 -331.02 -220.30 -249.00 -241.66 -126.36 
 (-11.38) (16.22) (6.13) (4.2) (6.56) (2.05) 
       
Number of Children  6-13 years -77.09 -68.58 -35.07 -42.35 34.00 -28.52 
 (-3.95) (5.22) (3.79) (2.2) (1.65) (1.13) 
       
Total Number of children 30.04 30.02 -31.23 -43.91 10.40 -31.47 
 (1.25) (0.26) (1.82) (2.88) (0.56) (1.4) 
       
Self –Reported Health Status -251.08 -357.50 -396.3 -367.7 -237.71 -173.15 
 (-7.76) (15.83) (4.5) (5.08) (5.26) (2.74) 
       
(c) Elasticities       
       
Uncompensated elasticity 1.64 1.37 1.04 1.11 1.24 1.35 
       
Income elasticity -.13 -.066 -0.0013 -0.0013 -.002 -.008 
       
Compensated Elasticity 1.67 1.37 1.04 1.11 1.24 1.35 
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Note: Dependent Variable is annual hours of work. t statistic is reported in parenthesis. Other controls include a quartic in age, family size and 
year dummies.  Column (5) does not include family size and quartic in age but includes interaction of year dummies with the children variables 
and health. The estimates are based on 6462 person years of observations.  For trimmed least squares and trimmed least absolute deviation 
estimators, the optimization of the objective function was carried out using Powell’s algorithm. Parameter estimates were almost identical for a 
number of different starting values. Family Size was used as the exclusion restriction in all specifications. Note that Semiparametric estimator in 
column 5 is the estimator proposed by Kyriazidou (1997) and in column 6, results are presented from the instrumental variable extension of this 
estimator by Charlier, Melenberg and van Soest (1997). 
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Table 6: Sensitivity of the Wage and Income Elasticity to the Instrument for the Net Wage, by Estimator 
(Dependent Variable: Annual Hours of Work) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Husband’s last dollar MTR 
Maximum State 
MTR 
Maximum Federal 
plus State MTR 
Maximum State 
MTR for Synthetic 
Tax Payer 
Maximum Federal 
plus State MTR for 
Synthetic Tax Payer 
Pooled Tobit Estimator 
 
     
      
Uncompensated elasticity 1.64 1.92 1.90 1.92 1.90 
      
Income elasticity -.13 -.27 -.27 -.27 -.27 
      
Compensated Elasticity 1.67 1.94 1.93 1.94 1.93 
      
Kyriazidou’s Estimator 
      
      
Uncompensated elasticity 1.35 1.28 1.23 1.28 1.23 
      
Income elasticity -.008 -.023 -.038 -.023 -.037 
      
Compensated Elasticity 1.35 1.29 1.24 1.29 1.24 
Note: Maximum State MTR instrument was created by calculating the state marginal tax rate for the sample by assigning an adjusted 
gross income of $350,000 to everybody. Maximum Federal plus State MTR is the sum of state and federal marginal tax rates 
calculated by using similar methodology.  Maximum State MTR for Synthetic Tax Payer instrument was created for a synthetic 
individual with 2 dependents, filing jointly and with an income of $350,000.  Maximum Federal plus State MTR for Synthetic Tax Payer 
is the sum of state and federal marginal tax rates calculated by using similar methodology. 
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Table 7: Results Using Predicted Wages Only For Non-Workers 
(Dependent Variable: Annual Hours of Work) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Pooled Tobit With IV 
Random Effects 
With IV TLS TLAD 
Semiparametric 
(IV) 
Parameter Estimates      
      
After tax wage 255.73 214.01 115.70 117.20 517.75 
 (50.56) (21.73) (10.59) (16.43) (0.9) 
      
Virtual full income -.0096 -.0041 -0.0002 -0.00001 -0.0050 
 (-3.75) (-0.82) (-0.012) (-0.003) (0.009) 
      
Elasticities      
      
Uncompensated 
elasticity 0.97 0.67 0.41 0.42 1.82 
      
Income elasticity -0.280 -0.100 -0.007 -0.003 -0.160 
      
Compensated Elasticity 1.02 0.69 0.41 0.42 1.85 
 
Table 8: Sensitivity to Functional Form 
(Dependent Variable: Annual Hours of Work) 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
Linear Labor 
Supply 
 
Quadratic 
Labor Supply 
 
Using Predicted Wage 
 
  
   
Uncompensated elasticity 1.64 2.02 
   
Income elasticity -0.130 -0.038 
   
Compensated Elasticity 1.67 2.03 
   
Using Predicted wage only 
for non workers  
 
   
Uncompensated elasticity 0.97 0.92 
   
Income elasticity -0.28 -0.16 
   
Compensated Elasticity 1.02 0.95 
                                    Note: Pooled Tobit estimation was used for these results. 
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Table 9: Estimated Deadweight Loss from Revenue Neutral Proportional vs.  
Actual Progressive tax system from 1980-1987 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Progressive Proportional 
   
   
Compensating variation 4951 4821 
   
Exact Deadweight Loss 1588 1458 
   
DWL/Tax Revenue 0.57 0.49 
   
Note: Deadweight loss is reported for the median household.  The values in different columns  are  
based on Random Effects IV  Estimates from Table 5. The actual tax rates for wives were 
calculated using TAXSIM. It was assumed that the first-dollar tax rate on wife’s labor income is 
the last-dollar tax on husband’s income. 
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Table 10: Parameter Estimates from GMM Estimation of  
Intertemporal Preference Parameters 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note: t statistic in parenthesis 
Explanatory Variables Estimates 
  
Constant 1.78 
 (3.31) 
  
Asset .0025 
 (2.43) 
  
Number of Children 1-2 years -.056 
 (-2.53) 
  
Number of Children 3-5 years -.033 
 (-1.39) 
  
Number of Children  6-13 years -.015 
 (-1.15) 
  
Total Number of children .004 
 (0.51) 
  
Self-Reported Health Status -.062 
 (-2.13) 
  
ρ  .053 
 (3.56) 
  
Sargan Statistic 0.79 
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APPENDIX 1 
Construction of Differentiable Budget Constraint 
   Marginal Tax Rates are calculated using NBER TAXSIM. We constructed a 
grid of adjusted gross incomes (AGI) from $50 to $350,000. We then use NBER's TAXSIM 
to generate marginal tax rates at every level of AGI in $50 interval conditional on tax status 
defined by any combination of tax marital status, number of dependents and age exemption. 
The individual’s marginal tax rate τ  was obtained from this grid. 
 The budget set can have multiple kinks depending on the tax status of the individual 
and can have multiple points of nondifferentiability, we constructed a differentiable budget 
constraint using a method suggested by MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) and 
implemented by Ziliak and Kniesner (1999), to smooth the budget set around the kink 
points. First a lower bound and an upper bound was found from the TAXSIM grid below 
and above which the marginal tax rates do not change. Thus we explicitly took accounted 
for the first kink and the last kink in the budget set. The individual’s budget sets around all 
the remaining kink points were approximated using a cubic polynomial. Because NBER 
TAXSIM does not report taxable income, we fitted a cubic polynomial of tax rates on 
adjusted gross income.  Because the marginal rate is a smooth and continuously 
differentiable function of adjusted gross income, we can integrate the function back to 
obtain total tax payments. Using the coefficients from the polynomial regression, we were 
able to get the implicit tax rates at income levels corresponding to each contribution level in 
$50 intervals. 
          ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
+Φ−Φ=
k
j
jj HIHIHI
1
1 )()())((τ̂  ))(( HIbi              (A.1) 
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τ̂  is the smooth marginal tax rate. Separate parameter estimates were obtained for the cubic 
polynomial )(( HIbi depending upon the cells defined by marital status, number of 
dependents and age exemption37. 
 Following Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) we added average state tax rate and payroll tax 
to the function. Then the Taxes paid were calculated by integrating the above function. 
          itficaficastlbubiublblblbit dIHIbIT ττττ Φ++Φ+Φ−Φ+Φ−= ∫ )(()()1()(               (A.2) 
Where stτ  is the average state tax rate and ficaτ  the payroll tax rate. 
                                                 
37 Similar strategy has been applied in Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002)  
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APPENDIX 2 
Random Effects Tobit with Instrumental Variables 
In standard random effects Tobit specifications, the following assumptions are made 
with regard to labor supply equation (20).  
                                                            ),0(~ 2ϑσϑ INi                                                    (A.3) 
                                                             ),0(~ 2uit IN σε                                                   (A.4) 
                                                           0),( =itiCov εϑ                                                   (A.5) 
                                                                0),( =iti xCov ϑ                                                  (A.6) 
                                                              0),( =ititxCov ε                                                  (A.7) 
In the random effects model that I estimate, I treat both after tax wage and virtual 
income as endogenous. Therefore, I relax assumptions (A.6)-(A.7), while retaining (A.3)-
(A.5).  For asymptotically efficient estimation with instrumental variables, I use an 
extension of the Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) estimator of Newey (1987). 
This procedure requires consistent estimates of the structural parameters ),( βα .38 Estimation 
proceeds as follows. In the first step I estimate the following reduced form equations for 
after tax wage and virtual income assuming random effects. 39 
        itiitit vX 111 ++Π= αω                                              (A.8) 
     itiit
Cv
it vXY 222 ++Π= α                                  (A.9) 
                                                 
38 These are obtained using the method suggested by Smith and Blundell (1986). This approach has been 
extended to panel data by Vella and Verbeek (1999).   
39 I tested for the null of pooled OLS against random effects. The Breusch-Pagan test statistic soundly rejected 
the null of appropriateness of pooled OLS on this sample. 
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itX  contains the two instruments (first dollar after tax wage rate and first dollar virtual full 
income) and all the other exogenous variables in the model. Next, I estimate the residuals 
from the above regression i.e. itiititiit vuvu 222111 ˆˆˆ,ˆˆˆ +=+= αα . I estimate the following hours 
equation using random effects Tobit with the residuals from the first stage included as 
regressors.40  
    itiititit
Cv
ititit uuXYH 212121111
* ˆˆ υυλλδβαω ++++++=                   (A.10) 
This is in the spirit of Vella and Verbeek (1999) who show that conditional on these residual 
terms, the error in the primary equation has an error component structure. Conditional on 
estimated residuals from the first stage, i1υ  is a random effect and (A.10) can be estimated 
using random effects Tobit procedure by integrating out the individual heterogeneity. This 
gives us consistent estimates of ),( βα . In the next step I use AGLS estimator of Newey 
(1987) to obtain the asymptotically efficient estimates of all the structural parameters.41  
                                                 
40 Vella and Verbeek (1999) suggested including the time means of residuals ii uu 21 , . In the actual estimation 
adding  ii uu 21 ,  to the regression made statistically indistinguishable difference to the estimates. So, I report 
results conditioning on just  itu1̂  and  itu2ˆ .  
41 A panel data application of Newey (1987) can be found in Schineller (1999). This procedure involves 
estimating a reduced form of the hours equation. From a consistent (but not efficient) estimate of ),( βα  and the 
reduced form estimates, Newey's procedure uses minimum distance to recover asymptotically efficient 
estimates of the structural parameters. The procedure is also known as Amemiya Genralized Least Squares 
(AGLS) after the original suggestion of this approach by Amemiya (1978). 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Table A.1: Replication of  Triest (1983) specification 
 
 Triest (1983) 95% Confidence Interval This Paper 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
(a) Parameter Estimates       
       
After Tax Wage 306.6 225 388.2 269.262 173.99 364.53 
 (40.8)   (48.60)   
       
Virtual  Income -.0219 -0.0291 -0.0147 -0.01 -.013 -.006 
 (.0036)   (.001)   
       
Age-45 (45=0) -66.6 -104.8 -28.4 -50.425 -77.75 -23.09 
 (19.1)   (13.9)   
       
Children < 6 -374.3 -494.1 -254.5 -495.248 -639.23 -351.25 
 (59.9)   (73.46)   
       
Family Size -213.9 -287.9 -139.9 -40.667 -118.33 37.00 
 (37.0)   (39.62)   
       
Bad Health -350.8 -610.6 -91 -686.435 -964.88 -407.98 
 (129.9)   (142.06)   
       
Constant 1003.6 558.2 1449 348.62 -240.60 937.85 
 (222.7)   (300.63)   
     
Sigma 1010.6  1039.56  
 (35.9)    
     
(b) Elasticities     
     
Uncompensated Wage 
Elasticity 1.12 
 1.17  
     
Income Elasticity -0.31  -0.35  
     
Compensated Elasticity   1.21  
     
 
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. The number of observations range form 872-892 
in different years. All columns include quartic in age and family size as controls. Elasticities 
evaluated at sample means. 
 
